What happens to the NIMBY syndrome when we bring money to the table? A qualitative perspective on attitudes towards local nuclear waste repository by Stjernqvist, Love
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________ 
 
What happens to the NIMBY syndrome when 
we bring money to the table? 
 
A qualitative perspective on attitudes towards local nuclear 
waste repository 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor Thesis in Political Science 
Author: Love Stjernqvist 
Tutor: Peter Esaiasson 
Fall 2017 
Word count: 11 977       
1 
 
Abstract 
Nuclear waste repository constitutes a great predicament in many countries. In Sweden, the Not-
In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome has been rampant, as local opposition has blocked the 
attempts at storing nuclear waste at numerous occasions. If the dilemma is to be settled, the voice 
of the public must be heard. From a qualitative perspective, this thesis examines public reactions 
towards local nuclear waste repositories. When allocating unwanted facilities, the distribution of 
costs and benefits is regularly perceived as unfair by the local residents. This thesis, therefore, 
explores the effect of offering individuals a monetary compensation in exchange for living near a 
perceived nuisance. With the methodological approach of long interviews, several lines of 
reasoning are characterized. It was found that individuals opposing the local facility siting argued 
on the basis of a critique towards the scientific community, by voicing a great anxiety of potential 
health hazards. This line of reasoning was split in two, when compensation was offered. Some were 
inclined to accept the facility in exchange for a compensation, while others were not. A different 
line of reasoning is displayed by those with a positive attitude towards the thought of their 
community hosting the facility, with or without compensation. Emphasizing a trust in the scientific 
community, these individuals felt at ease with the prospect of a local nuclear waste disposal. 
 
Keywords: line of reasoning, long interviews, monetary compensation, NIMBY, nuclear waste 
repository 
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      “O Duty! 
      Why hast thou not the visage of a sweetie or a cutie?” 
- Ogden Nash 
 
1. Introduction 
What do prisons, airports and facilities for final disposal of nuclear waste have in common? They 
all trigger a form of human behavior known as the NIMBY syndrome (Not-In-My-Backyard). It is 
identified as a social rejection towards the siting of infrastructure and facilities which are, albeit 
societal necessities, locally unwanted. As governments seek to allocate societal infrastructure, local 
resistance constitutes a great predicament. Tantrums based on energetic citizen participation 
frequently cause national planning issues as people partially let their parochial attitudes stand in 
the way of a societal need (Eagle, 2005; Wolsink, 2000; Lake, 1993). However, the NIMBY 
syndrome may be understandable, considering the costs of construction projects are usually 
geographically concentrated while the benefits may be shared by a much larger population. Such 
costs may include, among other things, a decrease in property values and a negative impact on the 
local environment. Citizen protests should therefore not purely be regarded as selfish and irrational 
behavior (Kraft & Clary, 1991; Mannarini & Roccato, 2011).    
 In instances where the allocation of infrastructure is perceived by some to be unwanted, it 
has been suggested that the local public should be fairly compensated for the nuisance. Monetary 
compensation has been proposed, but the research shows that economic incentives do not always 
sway individuals into behaving in a certain manner (World Bank, 2014). The empirical evidence 
is conflicting, and it appears as if the effect varies. On some occasions the local public may be 
persuaded into accepting the siting of unwanted infrastructure, when offered a monetary 
compensation. At other times, the incentive fails to fulfill its purpose (Gallagher, Ferreira & 
Convery, 2008).           
 By including a qualitative perspective, this thesis adds a substantial aspect to the research 
field. Instead of merely testing whether individuals are positive or negative towards being offered 
a monetary compensation, this thesis attempts to answer why, and as to how individuals arrived at 
their preferences. Studying lines of reasoning, this thesis aims at exploring unanticipated motives 
used by individuals arguing on unwanted construction projects. The purpose is to study whether 
the same individuals would argue differently when offered an economic compensation. Unlike 
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most research on the NIMBY syndrome, this thesis includes a wider perspective by studying both 
those who oppose, as well as those who favor a certain local facility siting. The comparison makes 
it possible to depict how the rationale of those displaying the NIMBY syndrome differs from others 
when offered a monetary incentive.        
 Local protests have posed as great difficulties in the establishment of several controversial 
facilities. One distinctive example of an infrastructure project halted by the NIMBY syndrome is 
the siting of nuclear waste storage in Sweden. For decades, it has been a societal need to find safe 
locations in Sweden to place facilities for final disposal of radioactive waste. Several communities 
around the nation has over time been suggested as possible locations for the facilities, but due to 
local organized protests most geological examinations have been cancelled. There are now only 
two communities left in consideration (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, 2017).   
 The ongoing project of nuclear waste storage in Sweden works well as the basis for this 
thesis to explore individual’s reaction on monetary compensation. As the project has been blocked 
for decades, there is a need for change. It has been demonstrated that a great many individuals 
disapprove of the local siting of nuclear waste disposal, but a thorough study of relevant realm of 
thoughts, i.e., the rationale behind the protests, has not been demonstrated.   
 In an empirical study, Frey, Oberholzer-Gee & Eichenberger (1996) measured individuals’ 
reactions on being offered monetary compensation for the siting of a local nuclear waste repository. 
They found that the incentive decreased the acceptance for the facility siting. This thesis resembles 
the study by Frey et al., but has a different focus and methodological approach. It studies 
individuals’ perception of others and the scientific community. Simply declaring that there is a 
resistance towards certain construction projects does not solve the issue of facility siting. If the 
crucial challenge is to be handled, and the protestors are to be pleased, their lines of reasoning must 
be heard. This thesis attempts at adding a valuable contribution to the pursuit of finding suitable 
locations for the establishment of nuclear waste repositories, while also providing scientific 
supplement on the human reaction to monetary compensation.     
 Beginning with a literature review, this thesis presents research on the NIMBY syndrome, 
the project of storing nuclear waste in Sweden, as well as human reaction to monetary incentives. 
Further, the purpose, research questions and methodological approach are introduced, followed by 
the results. In an analysis of the collected material, a discussion is thereafter held on what scientific 
contributions this thesis may display. Finally, a conclusion summarizes the thesis. 
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2. Literature review 
Introducing the relevant research on the Not-In-My-Backyard syndrome, this literature review 
begins its thematic structure. The ongoing project of finding locations to store nuclear waste in 
Sweden is then presented, followed by the research on human reactions to monetary compensation. 
Lastly, the research gap is identified, which illustrates the attempted contribution of this thesis. 
 The NIMBY syndrome in its quintessential form is characterized by the local protests 
towards the siting of a certain project which is a widely recognized necessity. Frustrated by 
perceived potential costs the facility siting might have on the local community, public opposition 
has prevented the establishment of many facilities around the globe (Munton, 1996; Inhaber, 1997: 
6). When the public oppose the siting of a societal necessity it makes for a democratic quandary. 
A recurring pattern amidst the objecting individuals is a distrust in project sponsors and scientific 
experts. It has been suggested that the assurance of experts will have no appeasing impact on 
skeptical individuals (Michaud, Carlisle & Smith, 2008; Kraft & Clary, 1991; Smith & Marquez, 
2000). In various measures, the NIMBY syndrome has been studied extensively. Among other 
examples, the focal point has been on types of facility, the distance between individual and facility 
and the implementation process (Esaiasson, 2014; Wolsink & Devilee, 2009).   
 The NIMBY syndrome frequently appears amidst other acronyms in literature. For 
instance, when referring to the object of aversion, the LULU effect (Local-Unwanted-Land-Use) 
is the most suitable acronym. Other examples include the acronym used to describe a relatively 
new opposition trend against technological progress known as the BANANA effect (Build-
Absolutely-Nothing-Anywhere-Near-Anyone). The NIABY syndrome (Not-In-Any-Backyard), 
too could be another example to the subject matter. It is of significance, inasmuch as it distinguishes 
those who oppose a facility in their own community from those who object the infrastructure 
project regardless of location (Wolf, 1987; Tipaldo, 2011; Pol, Di Masso, Castrechini, Bonet & 
Vidal, 2006).           
 In the pursuit of finding locations to place facilities for final disposal of nuclear waste, the 
NIMBY syndrome surfaces recurrently. The disposal of high-level nuclear waste has even been 
defined as “the ultimate siting controversy” (Kraft, 1996: 108). Sweden constitutionally guarantees 
local spheres a voice in the decision-making process, which favors local protests in cases relating 
to nuclear waste repositories (Söderholm, Pettersson, Ek & Michanek, 2007). From a judicial 
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perspective, the Swedish Government requires the approval of a municipal council before 
permitting the local storage of nuclear material. However, the Government may neglect the local 
veto, if it is considered to be of utmost importance and in line with the national interest (Ch. 17, § 
6, in SFS 1998:808).          
 Since the 1970s, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Company (henceforth referred to as the SKB) 
has been responsible for finding safe areas in Sweden for nuclear waste disposal. This project has 
been overseen by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (henceforth referred to as the SSM). 
Between 1977 and 1985, the SKB made geological examinations in eight different locations all 
around Sweden, with the ambition of finding safe regions to store both high- and low-level 
radioactive waste. In order to disrupt the test drillings by the SKB, the residents of one Swedish 
village went as far as creating what was at that time known as the world’s most prolonged 
antinuclear protest (Åhäll et al., 1988: 43-45; Lake, 1993). Due to complaints from several of the 
local communities, the geological examinations were cancelled (Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority, 2017).           
 In the year 2000, three new locations were being presented by the SKB as potential keepers 
of the nuclear waste, and once again, the NIMBY syndrome emerged. One of the municipalities, 
Tierp, quickly withdrew from the project after a vote in the city council. Subsequently, only two 
communities remain in consideration. Eleven years later, the SKB applied for permission to 
construct facilities for final disposal of nuclear waste in the two remaining communities – 
Oskarshamn and Forsmark. Both chosen locations are already hosts of nuclear power plants. The 
application to store high-level radioactive waste in Oskarshamn is still being examined (Swedish 
Radiation Safety Authority, 2016). In December of 2017, the SSM and the Swedish Land and 
Environment Court announced the SKB’s application for a license to construct a facility for final 
disposal of low- and intermediate-level waste in Forsmark. The case is planned to be tried in a main 
hearing under the Swedish Environmental Code in the end of 2018. Until then, organizations, 
concerned regulatory authorities and other parties will be able to comment on the application 
(Swedish Nuclear Fuel Company, 2017).        
 To ignore the problem of finding a safe location to store the nuclear waste is certainly 
unsustainable. Since the SKB’s project has faced strong local opposition, it might be worth 
evaluating alternative procedures. In situations where a locally unwanted infrastructure project 
affects a small part of the population more than others, some believe it is necessary to design a fair 
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compensation mechanism (Mueller, 2017; Sakai, 2012; Chiou, Lee & Fung, 2011). Such a 
mechanism is primarily characterized as monetary compensation, and has been suggested on 
various occasions, in Sweden as well as internationally (Devlin, 2005; Inhaber, 1997; 199-200). In 
the study of public opinion, self-interested motives are enhanced when individuals sense that they 
will be significantly affected by a policy (Chong, Citrin & Conley, 2001). The NIMBY syndrome 
is often portrayed as behavior driven by self-interest, and therefore, monetary incentives have been 
proposed as reasonable attempts at changing the local public opinion.    
 The belief that individuals can be persuaded with economic compensation is advocated by 
the devotees of the theory of rational choice. It suggests that individuals are rational, and that they 
are more likely to choose outcomes with higher utility instead of those with lower utility. The 
theory portrays humans as narrowly self-interested by nature, referred to as “homo oeconomicus” 
(Aldrich, 1993; Brennan & Lomasky 1993:10; Kirchgässner, 2008: 12-13).   
 The empirical evidence differs on whether economic compensations reduce the local 
opposition towards facility siting. Local communities have been offered reimbursements on 
various instances, and it has been shown that while these incentives failed in some communities, 
in others, these achieved their purpose (Gallagher, Ferreira & Convery, 2008; Jerkins, Maguire & 
Morgan, 2004; Mank, 1991). Ergo, it is not a question of whether economic incentives influence 
public opinion, but rather when and how these incentives influence public opinion.   
 Where the acknowledged theory of rational choice describes individuals as economically 
self-interested, others find that monetary incentives may backfire. Criticism has been directed at 
the assumption that individuals will make calculated and rational choices, despite the contextual 
circumstances which may trigger an emotional response. Research shows that psychological and 
social aspects may inhibit individuals from responding to economic incentives (Kamenica, 2012; 
World Bank, 2014). People reject monetary compensation due to numerous reasons. When 
individuals regard the offered compensation as small, they sometimes get less prone to a certain 
action, than if they would receive no compensation at all (Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Gneezy & 
Rustichini, 2000). Monetary incentives have shown to be counterproductive in cases where the 
public identifies the compensation as a bearer of underlying unwelcomed social meanings (Bowles 
& Polanía-Reyes, 2012). Such meanings were displayed in Switzerland, where a local community 
went from having a positive attitude towards the suggestion of building a nuclear waste repository 
near their homes, to strongly opposing the project after being offered a monetary compensation. 
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The offered funds were interpreted as a bribe (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee & Eichenberger, 1996). 
Economic rationality also seems to be playing second fiddle to mitigation of risk and fairness of 
the facility siting process, in situations where the public perceive an apparent hazard (Lam & Woo, 
2009; Wolsink & Devilee, 2009).         
 The previous attempts at storing nuclear waste in Sweden has faced strong local opposition, 
and local concerns will likely appear again. A recurrent issue revolves around the distribution of 
costs and benefits, as local residents argues they are exposed to the main disadvantages. It has 
therefore been suggested that local communities should be compensated for the nuisance. Monetary 
compensation has been proposed, but the empirical evidence is conflicting on whether or not the 
incentives fulfills their purpose. As the research on human reaction to monetary compensation is 
insufficient, this thesis attempts to contribute to the research field with a qualitative perspective. 
The aspiration is to understand individual’s reasoning on nuclear waste repository, and what 
emotions are sparked by including a monetary compensation. 
 
3. Questions and methodological design 
The ambition of this thesis is closely connected with the theories and the research presented. A 
general depiction of the focus of this thesis appears as the title of this thesis. However, the title 
captures the essence, but not the specifics. A more explicit description would be to describe it as a 
qualitative study on the human response to being offered a monetary compensation in exchange 
for the siting of a local nuclear waste repository. The research shows that a consensus on what 
effect economic compensation has on the NIMBY syndrome has not yet been established. As the 
empirical evidence is conflicting, this thesis attempts to contribute with a qualitative perspective 
by using the methodological design of long interviews.      
  While primarily focusing on human response to monetary incentive, this thesis clutches on 
to the now more than ever relevant debate of nuclear waste repository in Sweden. The SKB’s 
previous attempts at suggesting locations to place a nuclear waste repository has resulted in several 
public outcries. Some protests may emerge again, as a decision on the facility siting for both high- 
and low-level nuclear waste will be made in the near future. In order to understand possible future 
protests, individuals’ trains of thoughts ought to be examined. 
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3.1. Research questions and purpose 
With the purpose of adding something substantial to the debate on how economic incentives may 
affect individual’s reasoning on the subject matter, it is necessary to initially measure the response 
without including the incentive. Thus, this thesis attempts to answer the two following research 
questions: 
1) How do individuals reason about locating a facility for final disposal of nuclear 
 waste in their neighborhood? 
 
2) How do the same individuals reason on the subject matter when offered a 
 monetary compensation? 
In qualitative research, hypotheses are not tested. Instead, this thesis focuses extensively on the two 
research questions. The most natural ways of contemplating the subject matter will be explored. 
Different from other studies on the NIMBY syndrome, this study will explore the thoughts of those 
in favor of the facility siting as well as those opposing. By not limiting the thesis to those opposing, 
a wider perspective on individual reaction may be discovered. The attempt is not merely to answer 
whether people are pro or against the facility siting, but rather how they arrive at these preferences. 
Due to the framing of the two research questions, the attempt is to suggest natural ways of reflecting 
on the issue at hand.           
 The main purpose is to explore individuals’ reaction to the local siting of a nuclear waste 
repository, and whether they would reason differently if offered a monetary incentive. Therefore, 
the results will not answer whether people in Sweden are generally positive or negative towards 
the facility siting or a monetary compensation. Neither will the results be able to rule out the 
possibility of other existing trains of thoughts. It merely visualizes the nature of arguments which 
are likely to appear. Crystallizing frequent modes of reasoning relating to the issue of nuclear waste 
repositories is desired, especially as the SKB’s attempts at locating the facility have been blocked 
in several instances. 
 
3.2. Design 
As the intention of this thesis is to grasp a qualitative understanding of the subject matter, long 
interviews form the most suitable methodological design. The strength of qualitative research lies 
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in its capacity to study complexities and processes in great detail, and discovering unknown aspects 
of the subject matter (Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 46). Questions of how may be answered with 
the intention of identifying individuals’ realm of thought (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2014: 31). Long 
interviews frequently make for a great complement to an already existing research field, inasmuch 
as it adds a focus on the lines of reasoning. Rather than survey polls, which measure how many 
reason in a particular manner, the chosen design explores an individual’s rationale. Using follow-
up questions, the interviewer can explore extensive range of thoughts, which is not possible in 
quantitative studies (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2014: 176-177). Hence, it is possible to capture 
unanticipated motives which would have gone unnoticed with other methodological designs 
(Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, Towns & Wängnerud, 2017: 260-261).  
 
3.3. Interview subjects 
Long interviews were conducted with fifteen individuals which may speak for a large population. 
The literature on methodological design suggests that fifteen interview subjects makes for an 
appropriate amount (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 268-269). Each interview took approximately half an 
hour, and was recorded. Most were held in Swedish, but not all. Based on the interviewees’ 
preference, one interview was executed in English. The main part of the quotation presented in the 
results of this thesis has been translated to the English language. For the results to be representative 
of a large public, several considerations were made as regards their selection.    
 First, individuals from a small community in southern Sweden, called Olofström, were 
chosen. If the main aspiration of this thesis would have been to contribute to the SKB’s ongoing 
project, citizens from Forsmark or Oskarshamn would have been the preferable selection. 
However, the purpose of this thesis is to explore how individuals in general reason about living 
near a facility for final disposal of nuclear waste, and whether the same individuals would argue 
differently when offered a monetary compensation. Therefore, citizens from practically any society 
makes for a valid choice, except for large cities, as they are never suggested as possible locations 
for nuclear waste storage.          
 Despite not being the core purpose of this thesis, the line of reasoning discovered in 
Olofström may still contribute to the SKB’s project. There is little reason to believe that individuals 
in Olofström would argue on fundamentally different grounds from those in Forsmark or 
Oskarshamn. Olofström is located in Blekinge, which is the neighboring region of Kalmar, where 
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Oskarshamn is located. As to this point, the Swedish Government has not yet decided where to 
place the facility for final disposal of nuclear waste. If Forsmark, Oskarshamn or any other similar 
society, was to be chosen, the habitants are likely to react in a manner resembling to the reaction 
of the public of Olofström.          
 Although there is one main difference between the societies, it need not form a 
complication. It might be argued that the public of Forsmark and Oskarshamn will be more inclined 
to accept the facility than other communities, as they already host nuclear power plants. Regardless 
of the veracity of that assumption, protests are still likely to appear, albeit with a lesser frequency. 
If the Government chooses to place the facilities in Forsmark and Oskarshamn, they will most 
likely be faced with similar public reaction as those found in Olofström. As this thesis attempts to 
identify the realms of thought, rather than the quantity of protests, Olofström suits the purpose just 
as well as any other community. If one is interested in knowing how the public of Forsmark and 
Oskarshamn will reason about the SKB’s project, then the results of this thesis could function as a 
guideline.           
 Second, fifteen individuals were selected based on the principle of maximal variation. The 
ambition was to neglect as few types of relevant individual attributes as possible. Reaching for a 
wider variety makes the results more representative of a larger public (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 270). 
As can be seen in table 1, the interviewees include both men and women in an extensive range of 
ages. Both gender and age were seen as relevant individual attributes, as the attempt was for the 
interview subject to reflect a larger public. Although, a choice was made limiting the variation of 
age among the interviewees. Minors were excluded, since the interviews were based on the premise 
of a theoretical referendum (which is described further in the interview guide). The support of such 
a distinction was that those able to vote in a referendum had the most relevant lines of reasoning 
to be discovered.          
 Education was another individual attribute of interest, primary as individual’s relation to 
the scientific community form a central theme of the interviews. The assumption was that 
individuals with a higher level of education might have a different view of the scientific 
community. Among the interviewees were individuals with various levels of education. In table 1, 
the interviewees are marked with an either high or low level of education. Those defined as highly 
educated in this instance have a post-secondary education, while the term low level of education is 
used for describing those with a secondary education, or an education of lower degree. As the 
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highly educated citizens of Olofström only constitutes approximately 14% of the community’s total 
habitants (Statistics Sweden, 2016), lowly educated individuals were shown to be more easily 
accessible. Although the lowly educated citizens exceed the highly educated in quantity, both 
categories are sufficiently represented in the selections.     
 The approaching towards potential interview subjects was made with the thought of 
maximal variation in mind. By knocking doors randomly, searching in the city square and by asking 
people in e.g. coffee shops to participate in an interview, a great variation among the interview 
subjects was established. The nonprobability sampling technique known as snowball sampling was 
operated with as well. Similar to a rolling snowball, continuously growing larger, the interviewees 
increased in total by suggesting new interview subjects from their own acquaintances (Esaiasson 
et al., 2017: 190-191). This method suits the purpose well, as long as the interviewees’ attributions 
still varies in the relevant categories.         
 In the results of this thesis, each of the fifteen interviewees has randomly been named with 
a letter, from A-O. In the first part of the interviews, everything quoted from the interview with 
“A” will be referred to as “1A”. Subsequently, the same person will be referred to as “2A” in the 
second part. Such an arrangement is meant to help the reader comprehend which quotes are said 
by the same person. The line of reasoning of all interview subjects has been taken into account, 
and every interviewee is quoted in the results at least once. 
 
Table 1 
 
Gender 
 
Age Profession Level of education Name 
Woman 56 Dementia nurse High A 
Man 20 Electrician Low B 
Woman 75 Retired Low C 
Man 31 Financial manager High D 
Woman 43 System operator Low E 
Man 64 Retired Low F 
Woman 52 Economist High G 
Man 32 Administrator Low H 
Woman 62 Local politician and assistant Low I 
Man 27 Soldier Low J 
Woman 32 Optician assistant Low K 
Man 46 Store manager Low L 
Woman 54 Nurse and self-employed High M 
Man 20 Marketer Low N 
Woman 49 Teacher Low O 
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3.4. Interview guide 
Composed of three main themes, the interview guide is designed to answer the two research 
questions.1 The two initial themes are fused in the results, as they are both attempts at answering 
the first research question, which reads “how do individuals reason about locating a facility for 
final disposal of nuclear waste in their neighborhood?”. To understand if individuals would reason 
any differently about the local siting of a facility for final disposal of nuclear waste if offered 
monetary compensation, it is necessary to initially delve into people’s thoughts about the subject 
matter without including the compensation. The interviewees are therefore not fronted with the 
thought of being offered a compensation until the last part of the interview. Instead, the interviews 
begin with some warm-up questions about their political interests and the duration for which the 
interviewees have lived in the community.        
 Next, the first out of the three essential themes begin. In the primary theme, the interview 
subjects are presented with the global discussion of where to place the facilities for final disposal 
of nuclear waste. The interviewees are being told of the ongoing mission of locating these facilities 
somewhere in Sweden and that the waste needs to be kept safe for a very long time. If given the 
opportunity to vote on a proposal on placing the facility in their municipality, the interviewees 
explain how they would react. Further, they are requested to envision what repercussions such a 
facility might have on their community, in terms of both advantages and disadvantages. 
 The second theme aims at exploring perceived health hazards. When hearing the words 
“facility for final disposal of nuclear waste”, the interview subjects are asked to describe what first 
comes to mind. Quite thoroughly, they are asked whether they would be worried in the event the 
said facility is established nearby and what worst-case scenarios they can imagine. The focus then 
shifts to explore how individuals will reason if scientists would estimate that the facility will be 
safe and that human health hazards would be insubstantial. People’s perception and their trust in 
experts are thereby measured. For the closing part of the second theme, the interviewees were 
tasked with contemplating whether there is a more preferable location for the nuclear waste to be 
preserved. Questions were asked about why the preferred location serves as a more suitable choice, 
and if the health hazards may differ in regards of location.     
                                                          
1 The complete interview guide is placed in the appendix. Note that follow-up questions are not included in the 
interview guide. Also, the questions of the interview guide were not followed slavishly, but all relevant themes and 
questions were covered. 
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 Finally, the concept of an economic compensation was added to the equation. The third 
theme aims at providing an answer to the second research question, which reads “how do the same 
individuals reason on the subject matter when offered a monetary compensation?”. Irrespective of 
the interview subjects’ thoughts, be it positive or negative towards the nuclear waste being kept in 
their community, they were faced with the idea of being compensated. The proposal was that 
everyone living in the community with the nuclear waste repository would receive 50 000 SEK 
each, (equivalent of roughly 6000 USD) annually for decades to come. This amount is inspired by 
the study of Frey et al. (1996), where the local public were offered approximately the same amount. 
For the interviewee to answer sincerely, the proposition was introduced in a very serious manner. 
The compensation was presented as a monthly tax deduction, and not as a bag full of money being 
delivered once a year. References were made to international examples of economic compensation 
being conducted in other situations where exist similar needs to place unwanted facilities. The 
interview subjects reacted to the notion of being compensated, the size of the compensation, and 
what they think of offering compensation to another community. Lastly, they were asked to 
speculate how they believe others would reason, given the same circumstances. 
 
3.5. Validity 
When analyzing attitudes and trains of thoughts from a collected interview material, the purpose is 
to interpret (Solér, 1997: 104). The risk with qualitative interviews is that the interviewer might 
make inaccurate interpretations of the thoughts presented by the interviewee. But by frequently 
questioning and checking the interpretations of the interview subject, the researcher can avoid 
having a negative impact on the validity of the results (Sandberg, 1994: 62). Verifying the validity 
of the collected material is not the final task, but something done continuously throughout the 
research process (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2014: 298-299). These guidelines were followed 
thoroughly.            
 Since all interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees, accurate quotation 
is possible in this thesis. The audio recordings were studied with caution and detail when 
transcribing and translating the material. In some instances, the quotes have been slightly edited 
for grammatical and legible reasons. Making smaller edits in the quotation is necessary (Kvale & 
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Brinkmann, 2014: 331), and does not affect the validity of the material.2 It is vital to reflect on 
what effect the phrasing of the interview questions may have on the validity of this thesis 
(Esaiasson et al., 2017: 61-62). Designed with the purpose of leaving much to the imagination, the 
interview guide was not supposed to lean the interviewees in a certain direction. Rather than 
presenting research about nuclear waste repository, the interviewees were asked which thoughts 
they would associate with the prospect of such a facility. The same logic applied to the framing of 
the monetary incentive, which was presented as a serious alternative without positive or negative 
characteristics.           
  When evaluating the most evident concerns of a study, the term “face validity” is usually 
operated with (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 62). The interviewees’ possibility of merely envisioning the 
suggested scenarios is a factor in need of problematizing. The SKB has not suggested Olofström 
as a potential host for a facility for final disposal of nuclear waste, and neither has the local public 
been offered a monetary incentive. There is a major difference between reasoning about a 
theoretical facility siting with an economic compensation, and the actual scenario. The individuals 
interviewed might have argued differently, if offered a monetary incentive in reality. This problem 
was difficult to bypass, as it was not possible to offer the interviewees 50 000 SEK each. Neither 
was it possible for me as an interviewer to stay at Forsmark or Oskarshamn for the time required 
to carry out fifteen interviews. Yet these limitations do not necessarily affect the validity of the 
results. The subject matter is emotionally charged, even without concrete proposals. As the 
interviewees were promised anonymity, there were no clear reasons for them to be dishonest or 
withhold their true opinions on the subject matter. By accentuating the gravity of the research, and 
asking the interviewees to answer sincerely, the material can be regarded as valid (Esaiasson et al., 
2017: 267).           
 It is also worth reflecting on whether the interviewer effect may have had an impact on the 
interviewees. The interviewer can have an influence on the interview subjects by creating an 
atmosphere where the interviewees feel comfortable sharing their realm of thoughts, or an opposite 
effect making the interview subjects distressed (Kvale & Brinkmann, 1997: 170). In order to not 
create a negative interviewer effect, interview scenarios were practiced beforehand. It is critical for 
the researcher to be aware of what signals the interviewee might be perceiving. By practicing, the 
risk of making mistakes such as interrupting the interview subjects or appearing to disagree was 
                                                          
2 The audio recordings are avaible for examination, if there are questions regarding their validity. 
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decreased. As the literature suggests, the interviewees were provided with encouraging and 
interested inflection, in an attempt to generate openness and participation (Marshall & Rossman, 
1989: 65). 
 
4. Results 
The results are divided in two parts, wherein the first attempts to answer the primary research 
question, which regards individual reaction towards the proposal to allocate a facility for final 
disposal of nuclear waste in their neighborhood. In figure 1, known as a category schedule, the top 
two shapes illustrate the two different trains of thought discovered. Below the shapes, general 
descriptions of the categories are displayed. The three following shapes represents the diverse 
thoughts triggered by the addition of a monetary incentive, thereby answering the second research 
question of this thesis.3 The figure also displays the structure of the presented results.  
Figure 1 
 
   Against    In favor 
 
      Distrusts the scientific community         Trusts the scientific community 
        Views the facility as hazardous              Views the facility as safe 
               Sense of powerlessness                 Sense of responsibility 
 
 
 
 Still against  
         
                  Compensating equals bribing     Compensation is fair                   Compensation is fair 
           Believes they are different than others            Believes they are similar to others               Believes they are similar to others  
                Prioritizes health before money 
                                                          
3 The observant reader may note that the fourth category, of which the study by Frey et al. (1996) is recognized for, 
was not identified. 
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4.1. Nuclear waste repository 
In the first major part of the interviews, the ongoing search for a safe location to place the nuclear 
waste repository in Sweden was introduced. The interviewees were asked how they would react if 
their community would be suggested as a host of such a facility, and how they would vote in a local 
referendum on the subject matter. Furthermore, they were asked what they associate with the words 
“facility for final disposal of nuclear waste”, and whether they could imagine both positive and 
negative effects of having such a facility in their neighborhood. By focusing on perceived hazards, 
the interviewees’ trust in the scientific community was examined. Although the level of political 
interest variated largely, all the interviewees stated that they would vote in a referendum on whether 
to place the facility in their neighborhood. The results did not find support for BANANA effect, 
nor the NIABY syndrome. I.e., the individuals did not seem to be protesting the idea of storing the 
nuclear waste, they merely wished it to be located elsewhere. The answers of the first segment of 
the interviews can be summarized in the two following categories: 
1. Those against placing the facility in their neighborhood 
2. Those in favor of placing the facility in their neighborhood 
 
4.1.1. “Mankind will destroy itself” – Those WHO OPPOSE 
The first out of the two very distinctive lines of reasoning are formed by those who oppose having 
the facility in their neighborhood. The NIMBY syndrome surfaced, as people associated nuclear 
waste repository with something hazardous. Even if they did not consider themselves to be well 
informed on the topic of nuclear waste repository, they still declared strong opinions about the 
subject matter. The fear of being ignored by those in power generated a sense of dejection and 
powerlessness. If given the opportunity, everyone in this category would vote against the proposal 
without hesitation. They described their community as too densely populated, and thus not an 
appropriate location for such a facility. At the same time, people in this category struggled to 
recognize some part of Sweden as a safer site than their own community. The risk was considered 
to be just as high, regardless of its location.       
 Northern Sweden, however, was unanimously considered a more suitable location, for two 
main reasons. First, fewer people live in that region, which would mean that fewer citizens would 
be affected if something were to go wrong. Second, northern Sweden was seen as being as far away 
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from their own municipality as possible. A more precise location was not suggested in this general 
line of thought. The essence was simply that the facility should be placed somewhere less densely 
populated. It was also suggested that the radioactive waste should be stored in the same area as the 
nuclear power plants are located. This line of thought coincides with the SKB’s strategy. Locations 
outside Sweden were suggested too, such as the desert of Sahara.     
 While emphasizing their negative attitudes towards locating the facility in their community, 
some indicated that they felt selfish and egoistical. They understood the difficult situation of 
finding a location for an unwanted facility, and their thoughts are well captured in the following 
quote: “(some might argue) that we have some kind of responsibility to the nation and that we 
should fulfill our duty, but I think it’s difficult to be that kind-hearted. I would have prioritized the 
wellbeing of myself, and those around me” (1N).      
 When asked what first comes to mind when picturing such a facility, the characterizations 
were exclusively negative. Leakage, radiation and cancer were shown as recurring anxieties, and 
people expressed fears of their community being exposed to a similar catastrophic nuclear accident 
as the Ukrainian city of Chernobyl. Such a scenario was associated with polluted nature and 
wildlife, and a “ghost town” (1A). At the top of the mind, one interviewee described the facility as 
isolated and surrounded by “signs of poison with skulls, and men in white overalls” (1L). In dread 
of the water and nature being contaminated, people within this line of thought explicitly stated that 
they would consider moving elsewhere if the facility were to be located in their municipality. Even 
if scientists would ensure that the nuclear waste would be safely managed, people would still feel 
worried. In fact, a tenacious distrust towards the scientific community in general was displayed 
among the individuals in this category. Two distinctive reasons behind the distrust were shared. 
The first was that scientists are merely human, that everyone can miscalculate. When planning for 
a nuclear waste repository, any mistake was considered to be fatal. This fear is displayed in the 
following paragraph, composed of several quotes from the interviews. 
 Not all science is properly done. Everyone can be wrong and make mistakes (1O). In the end, it’s 
 about real human beings taking care of the waste, and the human factor plays a considerable part. 
 You need to be able to trust that those managing the waste do it impeccably, and it has been shown 
 from time to time that mankind cannot be trusted (1M). I often say that by looking backward, 
 checking our history, we can find some patterns continuing in the future. Some things were once 
 regarded as perfectly safe. But when we look back, we see that it was absolutely ludicrous. I feel 
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 very skeptical (1N). Just because it was considered safe once, doesn’t mean it is now. One plus one 
 does not always equal two (1L). 
The second reason for distrusting scientists went beyond mistakes, by describing the scientific 
community as misleading and dishonest. As can be seen below, people expressed fears of being 
deceived by scientists with alternative motives. 
 When science becomes too commercial, with a large need to sell, I sometimes wonder what’s behind 
 it all (1E). I’m a pretty skeptical person […] Today it’s very expensive to conduct research, and if 
 scientists would get in touch with someone willing to finance their research, then we’re talking 
 about a lot of money. It’s usually an organization, company or someone with a special interest on 
 the subject matter. They want to find a specific answer, which often affects the result of the scientific 
 study, what’s being revealed and what’s not (1H). You can do whatever you want with statistics, 
 you can twist and turn it into any advantage you prefer. Unfortunately, man can be bought with 
 money today. Most people are easy to persuade with money. […] Mankind will destroy itself, we 
 are going to destroy this earth (1M). 
Tasked with evaluating possible benefits of having a nuclear waste repository in their community, 
the potentially increased amount of labor was the most prominent speculation. Jobs regarding both 
building the facility and maintaining the waste, were seen as positive outcomes. Other than that, 
the general opinion may be summarized in the following quote: “There may be some advantages 
(of having the facility in this community), but since I’m against, I can’t really picture any 
advantages at all. I can only see fear and catastrophe in front of me… and man should have thought 
of this before we adopted nuclear power” (1M). 
 
4.1.2. “It’s about give and take” – Those in favor  
Not everyone who participated in the interviews showed signs of the NIMBY syndrome. A 
considerable amount reacted positively towards the proposition, and argued in favor of placing it 
in their community. As long as they would be assured that the waste would be handled responsibly 
and kept safe, they felt comfortable having the facility in their neighborhood. Northern Sweden 
was not immediately recognized as a suitable siting location, as it was for those in the first category. 
When asked to suggest a region to place the facility, the individuals argued that such a repository 
should be located deep within a mountain or below ground. It appeared not to be important whether 
it took place in their own neighborhood, or in any other part of the country.  
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 Reaching an end to the difficult challenge of finding a location for the nuclear waste 
repository appeared to be the strong motive. The commitment to the nation was a shared view, or 
as one interviewee put it: “it’s about give and take” (1G). This line of thought may be described as 
an act of pragmatism, as individuals saw a precarious situation which can go on no further. The 
quotes below summarizes this category well:  
 We need to trust the knowledge we have today (1G). We need to place it somewhere, we can’t just 
 leave it be. […] We have decided to use nuclear power, and then we need to take care of the waste 
 as well. […] We need to manage the situation, because sooner or later we’ll reach a point where we 
 can’t postpone it any longer. Preferably, this facility can be up and running before we close (the 
 nuclear power plants), because they can’t keep going forever (1F). 
Similar to those in the previous category, people in the second category admitted to not being well 
informed on the subject matter. The difference was that the individuals within this line of thought 
were not anxious about not knowing much about nuclear waste repository. Rather, they showed 
great trust in scientists and a confidence that the professionals are capable of storing the waste 
without making any irreversible mistakes. The attitudes toward the scientific community 
constitutes a great distinction between the categories. Unlike those in the first category, people with 
this line of reasoning expressed faith in scientists, in their fellow human beings and in Sweden as 
a nation. The Swedish construction standards were described as high, and therefore, people 
regarded the chances of being affected by leakage and radiation lower.  
 Furthermore, individuals with this line of thought argued that they could picture several 
benefits of having the facility in their community. Rather than merely putting an end to the struggle 
of finding a location for the facility, such a construction project would also gain their society. The 
plausible increase in labor was viewed as beneficial, just as it was by those who would vote against 
the proposal in a referendum. Additionally, the waste itself was estimated to have a later purpose. 
It was argued that the waste possibly could be used in the future, as “we are not stuck with the 
technology we have at the moment” (1J).       
 Imagining potential disadvantages of hosting the facility in their neighborhood appeared to 
be rather difficult for the individuals in this category. As safety reasons did not alarm the 
individuals with this line of reasoning, they struggled to imagine what negative impacts such a 
facility might have on their neighborhood. Even when asked to picture some worst-case scenarios, 
people still did not appear to be worried at a level necessary to vote against the proposal in a local 
21 
 
referendum. Just as with the people in the previous category, the Chernobyl disaster was 
mentioned, as well as thoughts of leakage and radiation affecting the nature in some degrading 
manner. Contrary to those in the first category, such negative consequences were regarded as 
unlikely, at least in the near future. One interviewee argued that he was not frightened, mostly 
because potential negative impacts might not occur until long after he had passed away. “If 
something were to happen, I think it would take a very long time before it was recognized. I might 
even be dead by then” (1B). 
 
4.2. Monetary compensation 
In the second part of the interviews, the feature of a monetary compensation was introduced. The 
attempt was to find an answer to the second research question of this thesis, which reads “how do 
the same individuals reason on the subject matter when offered a monetary compensation”. The 
interviewees were asked to how they would reason if they were being offered an economic 
compensation in the size of 50 000 SEK annually, for the storing of nuclear waste in their 
municipality. During this part of the interviews, the questions revolved around the interviewees 
view of a compensation, whether they would accept it and how they feel about offering a 
compensation to another community. They were also asked to speculate on how they think that 
others would reason. By introducing an idea of economic compensation, the interview subjects 
could be divided into three new lines of reasoning, which are listed below. 
1) Those who continued to refuse to place the facility in their neighborhood 
2) Those who changed their minds, from negative towards positive 
3) Those who continued to be in favor of having the facility in their neighborhood 
 
4.2.1. “You can’t buy a cure for cancer” – Those who still oppose  
The first line of reasoning belongs to those who argue that they would not be affected by the thought 
of a monetary reimbursement. Everyone in this category originally opposed the construction 
project and represented the NIMBY syndrome. Compensation or none, they still felt a deep concern 
and an anxiety that something dangerous might happen in a location with such a facility. With 
future generations in mind, the individuals in this category felt unable to accept the compensation. 
A prevailing theme was that “money comes and goes” (2D), while “you can’t buy a cure for cancer” 
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(2O). The general line of thought was that money only plays a minor part, when compared to 
perceived health hazards. It was argued that even if money “certainly would have a great impact 
on my life, it wouldn’t surmount my skepticism. […] It’s more important for me to live till the age 
of ninety, than have a compensation of 50 000 a year and only turn sixty “(2N).   
 The compensation was not merely viewed as a too weak incentive, but it was also associated 
with other negatives. The monetary reimbursement generated a bribe-effect, as people got the sense 
that they were being bought. “I don’t like it, it’s not right” (2C), one interviewee argued firmly. 
Offering an economic incentive was regarded as a possible attempt at silencing their critical voices. 
However, when asked how they would feel if another community (in e.g. northern Sweden) would 
be offered a similar arrangement, there were no disputes. They were in fact positive towards the 
idea of providing another municipality with a monetary compensation.    
 The size of the compensation was viewed as reasonable, even if they themselves was not 
interested in accepting it. It was argued that even with a larger amount, their response would have 
been the same. Individuals with this line of thought suggested that if the amount would have been 
higher, their suspicions would have been as well. “It would have felt like the scientific community 
had ’ganged up on us farmers’, in an attempt to ’scam’ us” (2N), expressed one interviewee. They 
expressed that they would have voted no in the referendum, even if the compensation would have 
been as large as one million SEK. The problem was with the facility, not with the compensation 
nor the size of it.          
 When speculating on how others would reason, if offered the same proposition, the 
individuals in this category gave very determined answers. Fundamental in this line of thought was 
that the individuals in this category believed that they would reason differently than others. Two 
main differences were presented. First, the distrust towards the scientific community was once 
again uttered, as the interviewees doubted the validity of the research. Fears of being deceived 
made them unwilling to accept the proposition. Stressing the importance of framing, the 
interviewees in this category argued that others probably would vote in favor of the facility siting, 
if the referendum would be shaped in a straightforward approach. If demands of transparency were 
met, it was argued that most individuals would be inclined to accept the proposition. It was implied 
that others would have lower demands of transparency, that they would be less skeptic and more 
inclined to trust the scientific community.         
 Second, the individuals in this category were certain that most people can be persuaded 
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with monetary incentives. Others were believed to be inclined to vote in favor of constructing a 
nuclear waste repository in their community, if offered a compensation. They themselves stood out 
from the rest, according to themselves. A strong moral compass was emphasized upon as the 
fundamental reason behind their unwillingness to be influences by compensations. Indications 
were made about others’ alleged low moral standards, and precarious economic situations. The 
following paragraph captures the general line of reasoning on this subject: 
 Today, money is everything. Everyone has a price. How much money could I get if I were to sell 
 my soul? I think this is like selling one’s soul, because we know that this will be dangerous for 
 100 000 years. We don’t care, since we’re not going to live that long (2M). Anyone would drool, 
 and many would have taken the deal. Money is something that everyone needs and lives for. But 
 my way of reasoning is quite the opposite (2K). 
 
4.2.2. “This could be a great industry” – Those who changed 
opinion 
Among those likely to vote against the construction project, some changed their minds when 
offered an economic compensation. After some time of reasoning, several appeared to be persuaded 
by the idea of a reimbursement. Initially, hosting a nuclear waste repository was believed to only 
cost their society a great many negative consequences. But as the interviews went on, the attitudes 
towards the project started transfiguring. From cost to benefit, the associations with the facility 
shifted – and so did their opinion on the subject matter. Individuals with this line of reasoning 
ultimately viewed the facility as a generator of profits, on an individual level as well as for the 
society. The size of the compensation was viewed as reasonable. Although, they believed that they 
would have voted in favor of the proposition, even if the sum would have been greater. Unlike the 
reactions presented in the previous category, health hazards appeared to no longer be as big of an 
issue. Nor were people affected negatively by a monetary incentive. The only apparent common 
ground was that both categories believed that others would vote yes in the referendum. 
 It was suggested that other nations should be allowed to store their nuclear waste in the 
Swedish facility, at a monetary expenditure. “This could be a great industry” (2L), one interviewee 
speculated. Contrary to those in the previous category, people with this line of thought argued that 
the market principle is to be considered as a societal good. “Everything can be bought with money” 
(2L), argued the people of this category in a joyous manner. Furthermore, they argued in favor of 
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a compensation, not just because they wanted to enjoy the reciprocity, but also so that they could 
support others. With a compensation, they felt that they would be able to provide economically for 
their families and future grandchildren. Supposedly, they would not have accepted the financial 
reimbursement “for my advantage, but rather to benefit someone else. And not for any other 
reason” (2I). That way, people suggested they would accept the compensation for altruistic reasons 
and not on selfish grounds. 
 
4.2.3. “Well, why not? – Those who still favor 
Those who initially supported the idea of storing nuclear waste in their neighborhood, and who 
kept that view after being offered an economic compensation, compose the final line of reasoning. 
After having argued about the responsibility to act in solidarity, they felt that a monetary 
reimbursement served a fair purpose. They saw no rational reason to refuse a monetary 
compensation for something they had agreed to even without the incentive. Simply put, “well, why 
not?” (2B) was the recurring line of reasoning when offered a compensation. One interviewee 
argued that “it sounds very reasonable. The tax pressure is too high as it is, and I think all forms of 
tax deductions are favorable” (2J).         
 While stressing that they would have voted in favor of the proposition with or without a 
compensation, they had no interest in declining such an offer. As long as the motion would be 
presented in a serious and justifiable action, the people in this category felt rather carefree. They 
approved the size of the compensation, and added that a too large compensation might have a 
negative effect on the local level of employment. People argued that “the larger the amount, the 
more people would be persuaded” (2F), and a society with financially independent citizens was not 
desired, as a society needs working individuals to function properly.    
 Similar to the two previous categories, they believed that most would vote in favor of the 
nuclear waste repository if granted a compensation. The individuals in this category viewed it to 
be plausible, since they themselves would have accepted the offer. Compensating local 
communities financially was seen as an effective way to find locations to place unwanted facilities. 
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5. Analysis 
One of the benefits of the methodological approach of long interviews is that it offers the possibility 
of thoroughly examining an individual’s line of reasoning. The existing research on the NIMBY 
syndrome suggests that skeptical individuals will not be reassured by the guarantees of scientific 
experts (see e.g. Gallagher, Ferreira & Convery, 2008). This thesis has found that expert statements 
do not only fail to persuade individuals, but may even evoke a negative response. Those expressing 
the NIMBY syndrome demonstrated a significant distrust in scientific experts. The fairly non-
provocative question: “would you say that you trust the scientific community in general?”, gave a 
striking response. By dividing the society in two distinctive groups, the interview subjects with this 
recurrent train of thought described scientific experts as dishonest and manipulative, while others 
was portrayed as ordinary. In various ways, this dividing structure can be described as populist. It 
juxtaposes “the people” against a corrupt elite financially sponsored by disingenuous actors. When 
arguing on how expensive it is to conduct research and how scientists can be bought with money, 
the interviewees never suggested what motives these financial actors might have for their actions. 
It was as if these actors might gain on locating the facility in a certain municipality, for unknown 
reasons. This line of reasoning indicates something about individuals perceived distance from the 
government and “the establishment”. A low trust in others were displayed, as well as a feeling of 
being let down.          
 Including a monetary incentive in the discussion only stimulated those arguments, as 
individuals with the aforementioned train of thought felt bribed rather than compensated. The size 
of the compensation did not appear to affect their reasoning, which has occurred in previous 
research (e.g. Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). Rather, several interview subjects refused the 
compensation, arguing that they could not be bought with money. Some interview subjects even 
argued that they would decline an annual compensation of one million SEK, which raises some 
questions. There is of course the possibility that a nuclear waste repository could spark such strong 
feelings of anxiety, that individuals may reject immense sums of compensation. It might also 
suggest that the individuals with this line of thought had a degrading view on others, and or a great 
desire to call attention to one’s own moral character. Furthermore, perhaps it merely indicates that 
the individuals were incapable of taking the theoretical scenarios seriously.   
 The need of fair compensation mechanisms has been requested in the NIMBY literature 
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(e.g. Mueller, 2017). If this thesis may present any substantial reflections on the subject matter, it 
is this: a compensation mechanism can only be regarded as fair if the affected individuals consider 
it to be true.  Ergo, a “fair” mechanism should in this instance be defined as “locally accepted”, if 
the SKB’s project is to be realized. Several individuals were unwilling to accept the compensation, 
while favoring the idea of offering another community the same compensation. In other words, 
they regarded the compensation as fair – but unwanted. If the siting difficulty is to be settled, 
perhaps the literature suggesting “fair” mechanisms offers little practical contribution. Rather, the 
voice of the local public must be heard if a development in the dilemma of nuclear waste repository 
is requested. If not, the attempted facility siting will face loud vocal protests, just as it has before. 
 Offering another Swedish community monetary compensation will likely generate similar 
lines of thought as those characterized in this thesis. While some will refuse the compensation, 
others will regard it as reasonable. This thesis indicates that some will be persuaded by the 
incentive, from opposing the project into arguing in favor. Advocates of the economic theory of 
rationale choice would argue that the changed opinion is in line with their description of human 
behavior, as narrowly self-interested.         
  In a notable study, Frey et al. (1996) illustrated how the bribe affect may cause large scales 
of individuals to shift opinion on local storing of nuclear waste, when offered a monetary 
compensation. Such an effect was not displayed amidst the interviewees of this thesis, as no one 
changed their mind from initially being in favor of the project. Although, that does not mean that 
individuals in Sweden would not reason in such a particular manner if offered a compensation. As 
this thesis merely attempt at suggesting which lines of reasoning are likely to appear, the pursuit is 
not to exclude any other potential train of thought. What this thesis can suggest on the topic of 
monetary compensation in regard to local nuclear waste repository, is that it triggers very different 
forms of reaction. Some individuals are persuaded, and some are not. Such a conclusion is rather 
undisputed, and not remarkably groundbreaking.        
 However, when examining how the interviewees viewed each other’s temptation to accept 
the compensation, this study does make for an interesting observation. All lines of reasoning 
displayed in this thesis included the impression that others would accept the compensation. The 
most intriguing instance might be that those who claimed they would refuse the compensation were 
very eager to explain that they were different from the rest. It was argued that they were 
fundamentally different from others. This line of reasoning is not unlike the hypothesis known as 
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the third-person effect. It suggests that individuals believe that mass media has persuasive effect 
on others, but not themselves (Davison, 1983). To some degree, these individuals considered 
themselves to be one of a kind, immune to monetary incentives. This is an interesting aspect of the 
NIMBY syndrome, and one which would have gone unnoticed with other methodological 
approaches. With long interviews, this thesis has identified an unanticipated form of behavior 
triggered by the proposal of monetary compensation, making for a substantial addition to the 
research field.            
 As a final analyzing remark, it is worth reflecting on the question: “for whom?”. All lines 
of reasoning were based on different justifications. When motivating their point of view, the 
interviewees generally suggested that their opinion would benefit a larger group, instead of 
describing what effect the compensation would have on their own life. The different groups may 
be categorized on an either societal-, national- or international level. Those who changed their 
minds believed that the facility would make their community grow stronger. It was suggested that 
the society would gain from being compensated. From a national point of view, those who were 
inclined to vote in favor of the proposition, with or without compensation, instead felt it was a 
public duty to accept the facility. By agreeing to store the nuclear waste in their community, the 
nation would see an end to the struggling dilemma. Those expressing the NIMBY syndrome 
accentuated what catastrophic consequences the nuclear waste might have if stored unstable. If 
something were to go wrong, mankind and the planet was believed to be in danger. Thus, by 
distrusting scientists it was indirectly argued that the international community would be kept safer. 
None of the interviewees described their decision as based on self-interest, contrary to how the 
NIMBY literature usually describe the public opposition (e.g. Lake, 1993). The fact that individuals 
wished to either accept or refuse the monetary compensation by referring to a larger group is worth 
noting, considering that such a compensation would primarily affect the individual. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The two research questions of this thesis are “how do individuals reason about locating a facility 
for final disposal of local nuclear waste in their neighborhood”, and “how do the same individuals 
reason on the subject matter when offered a monetary compensation”. By studying human behavior 
through the method of long interviews, this thesis has pinpointed five trains of thought, which 
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provides detailed answers to the research questions. The primary two lines of reasoning suggest 
likely reactions to local nuclear waste storage, whereas the following three outline the same 
individuals’ reactions to being offered a monetary compensation. Presenting the final three lines of 
reasoning in this conclusion is adequate, as they also contain the two initial trains of thought. 
 The first is characterized as the NIMBY syndrome, defined by individuals who oppose the 
idea of locating the facility in their neighborhood. These individuals argue that they would oppose 
the project even if offered a sizable monetary compensation. Perhaps the most interesting discovery 
in this line of reasoning was the strong distrust towards the scientific community. While previous 
research suggests that expert reassurance is not sufficient to calm sceptics, this thesis goes even 
further. Just the thought of scientists sparked an emotional response in these individuals, describing 
the scientific community as both corrupt as well as bound to make mistakes. This line of reasoning 
adds a substantial contribution to the NIMBY literature. When introducing a monetary incentive, 
this thesis found yet another previously unexplored aspect of the NIMBY syndrome. The 
interviewees in this category were certain that they argued on fundamentally different grounds than 
other individuals. Others were believed to be inclined to accept the monetary compensation, while 
they themselves were of a stronger and resilient character.     
 The second line of reasoning belongs to those who initially opposed the local facility siting, 
but changed their opinion when offered a monetary compensation. Similar to the previous category, 
these individuals criticized the scientific community. Despite the critique, they considered the 
reimbursement as fair and began hypothesizing on how the facility may benefit their society. In 
support of their changed opinion, the possibility of providing their family and relatives with 
financial support was emphasized upon.        
 Individuals in favor of locating the facility in their neighborhood formed the third and final 
train of thought. Generally, these individuals are not studied in the NIMBY literature, as they do 
not display a vocal opposition towards facility siting. But in this thesis, they have a comparative 
purpose to serve. Unlike those in the first category, these individuals neither expressed a distrust 
in the scientific community, nor did they worry about potential health hazards. Instead they argued 
that they would have welcomed the facility, with or without a monetary compensation.  
 Individuals’ perception of the scientific community has in this thesis been identified as a 
prominent contrast between those who oppose and those in favor of locating a facility for final 
disposal of nuclear waste in their neighborhood. This finding may serve as a basis for further 
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studies. If the struggle of allocating nuclear waste repositories in Sweden is to be settled, perhaps 
the SKB needs to adopt an approach which is in sync with the mindset of people as reflected in this 
thesis. 
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Appendix 
Interview guide 
 We will begin by talking about you and your views on the society you live in. Later on, we will 
 focus on a discussion regarding a potential construction project here in Olofström, and what your 
 thoughts are on the matter. When I have asked you all my questions, you will be able to air some 
 additional thoughts, if you have not already said all that you want to say. I want to emphasize that 
 there are no wrong answers, and it is important that you feel that you can speak as freely as possible. 
Introduction 
1. Please start of by telling me a little bit about yourself, e.g. age and profession. 
2. How long have you lived in this community? 
3. Would you say that you are interested in politics? 
a. Do you usually vote in elections? Why? 
4. How would you describe your relations to other citizens in this community? 
a. Do you know a lot of residents in this community? 
 
The first theme: introducing the topic 
 For a long time, there has been a global challenge regarding where to place the facilities for final 
 disposal of nuclear waste. Somewhere in Sweden, the nuclear waste needs to be preserved for 
 approximately 100 000 years. The main difficulties have been finding safe locations with citizens 
 that would approve such a facility being constructed in their community. Different whereabouts has 
 been discussed, but no such facility has yet to been established. If this community would be 
 suggested as a possible location for nuclear waste repository, the local public would be permitted 
 to have a say in the process. A local referendum or a similar arrangement might be designed to fully 
 consider the local publics thoughts on the matter. 
5. How would you react, if Olofström would be suggested as a possible host for a facility for 
final disposal of nuclear waste? 
6. What is the first thing that comes to mind when I say the words “a facility for final disposal 
of nuclear waste”? 
35 
 
7. If you for a moment were to set aside your own reaction towards the suggested construction 
project, could you imagine both positive and negative implications such a facility siting 
could have on this community? 
 
The second theme: views on potential health hazards 
8. How would you view the security and potential health hazards regarding said facility? 
9. Would you feel worried if the facility were to be located in this community? 
10. What do you think is the worst thing that could happen if the facility were to be located in 
this community? 
11. If scientists would estimate that the facility would be safe and that the health hazards would 
be insubstantial, how would that affect you reasoning? 
a. Would you say that you trust the scientific community in general? 
12. Could you imagine any other place in Sweden more suitable for storing nuclear waste? 
13. Do you think that the potential health hazards may vary in regards of where in Sweden the 
facility would be located? 
a. (If the interviewee’s answer is yes) Why do you think that? 
b. (If the interviewee’s answer is no) Why would the location you suggested in the 
previous question be a more suitable choice? 
 
The third theme: monetary compensation 
 There is an additional aspect of this political debate which I would like for you to consider. It is a 
 question about compensation. From an international perspective, it is not unusual to offer some sort 
 of compensation to the public living close to a, by some regarded as, unwanted facility. Such a 
 procedure might be in the form of a tax deduction. For a moment, let’s say that this community 
 would be suggested as an actual location to place the facility for final disposal of nuclear waste. 
 Let’s also say that everyone in this neighborhood would be offered a monetary compensation 
 equivalent of 50 000 SEK a year, for decades to come. Just as discussed earlier, a local referendum 
 might be suggested in order to interpret the voice of the local public. 
14. Under the condition that everyone in this community would receive such a compensation 
if the turnout of the referendum would be in favor of placing the facility in this community, 
how would you reason? 
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15. Why do you think it is that you did/did not change your opinion when a monetary 
compensation was suggested? 
16. Would you argue differently if the sum was greater? 
a. Would you accept an annual compensation equivalent to one million SEK? 
17. What do you think about offering such a compensation to the community you previously 
suggested as a more suitable location for nuclear waste repository? 
18. How do you think others would reason, if given the same circumstances I just presented to 
you? 
 
Closing question 
19. Do you have any last remarks that you have not already had the time to share? 
 
